The escalation of jihadist violence across the Sahel between 2017 and 2022 raised urgent and unresolved questions about the effectiveness of external counter-terrorism strategies. Despite sustained military training, arms transfers, intelligence sharing, and capacity-building programmes implemented through mechanisms such as the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), and the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM), terrorist violence in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger intensified dramatically during the period under review. By 2022, the Sahel had emerged as the global epicentre of terrorism-related fatalities, surpassing the Middle East and South Asia, while the same years witnessed successive military coups in key US security partner states, raising profound questions about the relationship between external military assistance and democratic governance. This paper critically examines the implications of US security assistance for counter-terrorism in the Sahel. The study analyses the strategic frameworks underpinning US engagement, the operational architecture of its assistance programmes, and the political and security consequences of sustained external military support in fragile postcolonial states. The paper argues that US security assistance during the period under review functioned more as a tactical stabiliser than a transformative force: it strengthened specific operational capabilities of regional partners but failed to reverse insurgent expansion, prevent democratic backsliding, or address the structural drivers of violence rooted in governance failure, economic marginalisation, and state legitimacy deficits. The study concludes by arguing that sustainable counter-terrorism in the Sahel requires a strategic rebalancing toward governance reform, accountability mechanisms, and inclusive state-building processes alongside, rather than subordinate to, military capacity-building.
Publication Date: 2026-06-19