Failures of governments to act on anthropogenic climate change cannot be grasped in terms of denial alone. One way of expanding the vocabulary for describing, criticising and holding to account government inaction is through the concept of collective akrasia. Akrasia denotes voluntary action by agents against their best judgements about the right course of action. This paper argues this can apply to governments as well as individuals. The paper outlines an approach to collective political akrasia that builds on Amélie Oksenberg Rorty’s work on the social and political sources of akrasia and Philip Pettit’s proposal for collective akrasia. It argues this concept contributes something valuable to the political and ethical vocabulary available for holding governments to account: Criticizing someone for their akratic character is different from criticizing them as ignorant, vicious or powerless, and the same goes for governments. Considering the place of akrasia in politics also opens broader reflection on questions of government agency and accountability – even if it turns out that akrasia is the wrong diagnosis, it is useful to consider why.
Preprint Notice: This manuscript is a preprint and has not yet undergone peer review.
Publication Date: 2026-06-18